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5 January 2011
Last updated at 17:55 ET
A series of decisions made to cut costs and save time contributed to last year's BP oil spill disaster, a US presidential panel has found.
In a 48-page report, the panel wrote the failures were "systemic" and likely to recur without reform in industry practice and government policy.
But it said BP management did not properly manage risks in the operation.
The April blast aboard the Deepwater Horizon killed 11 people and caused one of the worst oil spills in history.
'Avoidable' blow-out The report is critical of BP, which owned the well, Halliburton, which managed the well sealing operation, and Transocean, which owned the Deepwater Horizon rig, as well as inadequate government oversight and regulation.
"Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blow-out clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)," the presidential panel wrote.
"BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure that key decisions in the months leading up to the blow-out were safe or sound from an engineering perspective."
Bob Graham, former Florida governor and a co-chairman of the commission, said the blow-out was avoidable.
"This disaster likely would not have happened had the companies involved been guided by an unrelenting commitment to safety first," he said in a statement.
Risk factors In a months-long investigation, the panel appointed by President Barack Obama found that a series of missteps and oversights by BP, Halliburton, which was charged with cementing the well, and Transocean contributed to the blow-out.
It found mistakes and "failures to appreciate risk" compromised safeguards "until the blow-out was inevitable and, at the very end, uncontrollable".
BP's "fundamental mistake", the panel wrote, was failing to exercise proper caution over the job of sealing the well with cement.
"Based on evidence currently available, there is nothing to suggest that BP's engineering team conducted a formal, disciplined analysis of the combined impact of these risk factors on the prospects for a successful cement job," the report reads.
Specific risks the report identifies include a flawed design for the cement used to seal the bottom of the well, a test of that seal identified problems but was "incorrectly judged a success", and the workers' failure to recognise the first signs of the impending blow-out.
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In a 48-page report, the panel wrote the failures were "systemic" and likely to recur without reform in industry practice and government policy.
But it said BP management did not properly manage risks in the operation.
The April blast aboard the Deepwater Horizon killed 11 people and caused one of the worst oil spills in history.
'Avoidable' blow-out The report is critical of BP, which owned the well, Halliburton, which managed the well sealing operation, and Transocean, which owned the Deepwater Horizon rig, as well as inadequate government oversight and regulation.
"Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blow-out clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)," the presidential panel wrote.
"BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure that key decisions in the months leading up to the blow-out were safe or sound from an engineering perspective."
Bob Graham, former Florida governor and a co-chairman of the commission, said the blow-out was avoidable.
"This disaster likely would not have happened had the companies involved been guided by an unrelenting commitment to safety first," he said in a statement.
Risk factors In a months-long investigation, the panel appointed by President Barack Obama found that a series of missteps and oversights by BP, Halliburton, which was charged with cementing the well, and Transocean contributed to the blow-out.
It found mistakes and "failures to appreciate risk" compromised safeguards "until the blow-out was inevitable and, at the very end, uncontrollable".
BP's "fundamental mistake", the panel wrote, was failing to exercise proper caution over the job of sealing the well with cement.
"Based on evidence currently available, there is nothing to suggest that BP's engineering team conducted a formal, disciplined analysis of the combined impact of these risk factors on the prospects for a successful cement job," the report reads.
Specific risks the report identifies include a flawed design for the cement used to seal the bottom of the well, a test of that seal identified problems but was "incorrectly judged a success", and the workers' failure to recognise the first signs of the impending blow-out.
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