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Court can put reporting on hold if trial is at stake: SC
The Supreme Court on Tuesday refused to lay down general guidelines for media reporting on sub-judice matters in courts and instead directed that High Courts could direct postponement of publication if there was a substantial risk to the right of fair trial of an accused.
A five-judge Constitution bench which pronounced the decision treaded along a delicate path to ascertain whether publications made against an accused during trial or any person at the pre-trial stage harmed his right to a fair trial. The court was also to consider laying down guidelines to restrain future publication.
The bench of Chief Justice SH Kapadia, Justices DK Jain, SS Nijjar, Ranjana Desai and JS Khehar were of the unanimous view that guidelines ought not to be framed. Instead, the bench held that in cases where the High Courts or Supreme Court came to a conclusion that a particular publication offended the right of fair trial of any accused, it would be open to the court to order postponement of publication for a limited period.
Giving reasons, the bench said, “It is not possible for this court to enumerate categories of publications amounting to contempt. It would require the courts in each cases to see the content and the context of the offending publication. There cannot be any straitjacket formula enumerating such categories.”
But the bench found a suitable alternative by suggesting postponement of publication, which it described as a “neutralising device”. “In our view, orders of postponement of publications/publicity in appropriate cases, as indicated above, keeping in mind the timing (the stage at which it should be ordered), its duration and the right of appeal to challenge such orders is just a neutralising device, when no other alternative such as change of venue or postponement of trial is available,” said Chief Justice Kapadia, writing the judgment for the bench.
Moreover, it was only a “preventive action” evolved by courts to protect the Press from getting prosecuted for contempt, which is a penal action. At the same time, it prevented administration of justice from getting perverted or prejudiced, proving beneficial for the trial.
But the order of postponement would have several riders attached. The court held that it should be ordered for a limited duration and without disturbing the content of publication. Even when the court concluded there was real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, such an order would be resorted to as a last remedy when other alternative methods such as transfer or postponement of trial would not be seen as sufficient to prevent the risk.
If the above parameters were met, the bench said, “Such orders of postponement would fall within ‘reasonable restrictions’ under Article 19(2) and which would be in conformity with societal (public) interests.”
The need for the court to examine the issue in depth came on separate applications filed by corporate house Sahara India Real Estate Corporation and securities regulator SEBI, both who were locked in a legal dispute before the Supreme Court. At one point during the hearing, the court suggested both parties to arrive at a consensus. A confidential letter written by Sahara to SEBI got leaked to a TV channel, each blaming the other for the leak. On separate applications, the two sides demanded guidelines against the media to prevent breach of confidentiality in reporting sub-judice cases where no public interest was involved.
During the course of the hearing, the court invited applications from all interested persons and groups, of which many were accused facing trial who claimed their trial was prejudiced by media reporting. Except for Sahara and SEBI, the court entertained no other application.
Experts: It will not have much impact on media
New Delhi: The doctrine of postponing the publication of court proceedings in sub-judice cases evolved by the Supreme Court would not lead to unreasonable restrictions, say experts, who called for self-regulation instead of media guidelines.
Eminent jurists Shanti Bhushan and PP Rao said the verdict was within the ambit of the provisions of the Constitution and temporary restraint from publication of court proceedings cannot be granted as a right and at the same time it would make the journalist to be careful in reporting legal issues.
Rao said that the verdict is not an unreasonable restriction on the media, as “it (media) does not have complete freedom and even the Constitution imposes restrictions on the rights of the people”.
Bhushan agreed with Rao on the judgment but said such type of restriction would not have much impact as “generally no accused approaches the higher courts to restrain media from reporting his case.”
However, he said, “Media should be very careful in reporting. It should not do wrong reporting otherwise it would amount to contempt of court.
“The reporters should be present during the proceedings and note down the points carefully and if they have any doubts or queries, they should ask the counsel of that case.”
Rao, who had appeared for PCI, also said, “there is nothing new in this judgment” while referring to an earlier judgment of the SC in Naresh Sridhar Mirajkar vs State of Bombay in which it had prohibited publication of oral evidence provided by a witness.
The Supreme Court on Tuesday refused to lay down general guidelines for media reporting on sub-judice matters in courts and instead directed that High Courts could direct postponement of publication if there was a substantial risk to the right of fair trial of an accused.
A five-judge Constitution bench which pronounced the decision treaded along a delicate path to ascertain whether publications made against an accused during trial or any person at the pre-trial stage harmed his right to a fair trial. The court was also to consider laying down guidelines to restrain future publication.
The bench of Chief Justice SH Kapadia, Justices DK Jain, SS Nijjar, Ranjana Desai and JS Khehar were of the unanimous view that guidelines ought not to be framed. Instead, the bench held that in cases where the High Courts or Supreme Court came to a conclusion that a particular publication offended the right of fair trial of any accused, it would be open to the court to order postponement of publication for a limited period.
Giving reasons, the bench said, “It is not possible for this court to enumerate categories of publications amounting to contempt. It would require the courts in each cases to see the content and the context of the offending publication. There cannot be any straitjacket formula enumerating such categories.”
But the bench found a suitable alternative by suggesting postponement of publication, which it described as a “neutralising device”. “In our view, orders of postponement of publications/publicity in appropriate cases, as indicated above, keeping in mind the timing (the stage at which it should be ordered), its duration and the right of appeal to challenge such orders is just a neutralising device, when no other alternative such as change of venue or postponement of trial is available,” said Chief Justice Kapadia, writing the judgment for the bench.
Moreover, it was only a “preventive action” evolved by courts to protect the Press from getting prosecuted for contempt, which is a penal action. At the same time, it prevented administration of justice from getting perverted or prejudiced, proving beneficial for the trial.
But the order of postponement would have several riders attached. The court held that it should be ordered for a limited duration and without disturbing the content of publication. Even when the court concluded there was real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, such an order would be resorted to as a last remedy when other alternative methods such as transfer or postponement of trial would not be seen as sufficient to prevent the risk.
If the above parameters were met, the bench said, “Such orders of postponement would fall within ‘reasonable restrictions’ under Article 19(2) and which would be in conformity with societal (public) interests.”
The need for the court to examine the issue in depth came on separate applications filed by corporate house Sahara India Real Estate Corporation and securities regulator SEBI, both who were locked in a legal dispute before the Supreme Court. At one point during the hearing, the court suggested both parties to arrive at a consensus. A confidential letter written by Sahara to SEBI got leaked to a TV channel, each blaming the other for the leak. On separate applications, the two sides demanded guidelines against the media to prevent breach of confidentiality in reporting sub-judice cases where no public interest was involved.
During the course of the hearing, the court invited applications from all interested persons and groups, of which many were accused facing trial who claimed their trial was prejudiced by media reporting. Except for Sahara and SEBI, the court entertained no other application.
Experts: It will not have much impact on media
New Delhi: The doctrine of postponing the publication of court proceedings in sub-judice cases evolved by the Supreme Court would not lead to unreasonable restrictions, say experts, who called for self-regulation instead of media guidelines.
Eminent jurists Shanti Bhushan and PP Rao said the verdict was within the ambit of the provisions of the Constitution and temporary restraint from publication of court proceedings cannot be granted as a right and at the same time it would make the journalist to be careful in reporting legal issues.
Rao said that the verdict is not an unreasonable restriction on the media, as “it (media) does not have complete freedom and even the Constitution imposes restrictions on the rights of the people”.
Bhushan agreed with Rao on the judgment but said such type of restriction would not have much impact as “generally no accused approaches the higher courts to restrain media from reporting his case.”
However, he said, “Media should be very careful in reporting. It should not do wrong reporting otherwise it would amount to contempt of court.
“The reporters should be present during the proceedings and note down the points carefully and if they have any doubts or queries, they should ask the counsel of that case.”
Rao, who had appeared for PCI, also said, “there is nothing new in this judgment” while referring to an earlier judgment of the SC in Naresh Sridhar Mirajkar vs State of Bombay in which it had prohibited publication of oral evidence provided by a witness.
