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Apex court trashes AG plea on ‘citizens right’
The argument of the Centre denying private citizens the right to seek sanction against corrupt public officials was snubbed by the Supreme Court, much to the chagrin of the Attorney General GE Vahanvati who represented the Government in Court.
The three-fold argument proposed by Vahanvati was turned down as legally untenable by the bench of Justices GS Singhvi and AK Ganguly. The first argument questioned the locus standi (right to represent in court) of Swamy to seek sanction against former Telecom Minister A Raja.
The bench refuted this claim by stating, “There is no provision either in the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant.”
Vahanvati advanced two other points to suggest that an order of sanction, as pressed by Swamy, was required only at the stage when the Magistrate took cognizance of his complaint. This power of the Magistrate derived from Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) would have an overriding effect over Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, he argued.
Critical in its comments to reject the twin arguments, the bench said, “The argument of the learned Attorney General…is neither supported by the plain language of the section (Section 19 of 1988 Act) nor the judicial precedents relied upon by him.”
The argument of the Centre denying private citizens the right to seek sanction against corrupt public officials was snubbed by the Supreme Court, much to the chagrin of the Attorney General GE Vahanvati who represented the Government in Court.
The three-fold argument proposed by Vahanvati was turned down as legally untenable by the bench of Justices GS Singhvi and AK Ganguly. The first argument questioned the locus standi (right to represent in court) of Swamy to seek sanction against former Telecom Minister A Raja.
The bench refuted this claim by stating, “There is no provision either in the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant.”
Vahanvati advanced two other points to suggest that an order of sanction, as pressed by Swamy, was required only at the stage when the Magistrate took cognizance of his complaint. This power of the Magistrate derived from Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) would have an overriding effect over Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, he argued.
Critical in its comments to reject the twin arguments, the bench said, “The argument of the learned Attorney General…is neither supported by the plain language of the section (Section 19 of 1988 Act) nor the judicial precedents relied upon by him.”
